The Architecture of Psychoanalysis
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Much recent scholarship in this interdisciplinary terrain has focused on using psychoanalysis as a theoretical tool for interpreting architecture, I am interested here in reversing this relationship and thinking instead about the architectural structures already in place in psychoanalytic theory and practice. What I hope to draw out here are four ways in which architectural space registers in psychoanalysis. This includes topographic understandings of psychic processes and their representation in drawings, the spatial structuring of psychic life itself through the screens and folds of memory, as well as the architectural setting in which the psychoanalytic encounter between analyst and analysand takes place. My interest is in how psychoanalysis’s use of architecture might offer new approaches for understanding the connection between subjects, objects and spaces in architectural research and practice: specifically allowing considerations of buildings and those that design, occupy and interpret them that are material and psychic.¹

Freud’s Two Topographies: Boundaries, Surfaces and Passages
From his earliest research Sigmund Freud used diagrams to communicate his understanding of the various components and processes of the psychical apparatus, to highlight the topographical condition of psychic entities, as well as movements between them across territories, boundaries and edges. Freud drew on two topographies, both triadic models, to describe his understanding of the structure and processes of the psychical apparatus. The first topography consisted of the agencies of the conscious (Cs), preconscious (Pcs) and unconscious (Ucs) and was most clearly articulated in ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’ (1900). The second topography outlined in ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ (1920) and also in ‘The Ego and the Id’ (1923) included the ego, id, and superego.

A key aspect of the shift from the first to the second topography involved Freud’s conceptualization of repression and the nature of the boundary condition between
conscious and unconscious. The two are of course connected: Freud uses the term repression to describe “a process affecting ideas on the border between the systems Ucs. and Pcs. (Cs.)”. One of the earliest diagrams drawn by Freud is “Psychological Schema of the Word Concept”, originally published in 1891 in his work on aphasia. It shows the conscious and unconscious as two complexes – “word-“ and “object-associations”. This representation shows the division between conscious and unconscious in terms of two main branches of a tree, whereas in a later drawing, “Schematic Diagram of Sexuality” (1894), a line is used, sometimes dashed, to differentiate between two territories, one un-named located inside the boundary, and another labelled “the external world” situated outside. The line of the boundary also marks a channel of flow between what Freud names “the sexual object” and “the spinal column”. Crossing the territory encircled by this boundary are two further lines: a vertical line – the “ego boundary”, crossed by a horizontal line – the “somat.psych Boundary”.

In a subsequent diagram, “The Architecture of Hysteria” (1897), Freud represents the relationship between inner and outer worlds differently. The view–point of drawing’s architect has changed, and rather than a plan or section, where all the elements are drawn at the same scale, the various zones in this drawing – labelled I, II, III, IV – appear to recede into the distance like a perspective. The zones are linked by two layers of triangulated lines – one dashed, the other not – both of which diminish in size as they move away from the viewer.

Another three years later in “The Interpretation of Dreams”, Freud developed his visual representation of the passage of communication between inside and outside through series of schematic diagrams comprising vertical bands, similar to an architect’s cross-section through a substance. The final version showed perception (Pcpt.) at one end and the preconscious (Pcs.) at the other, with movement occurring from Pcpt. to Pcs. across a series of mnemonic traces followed by a dotted arc swinging under the vertical band representing the unconscious. Later on in the written text, Freud supplemented his topographical account of the nervous system
and the psyche, where the conscious, preconscious and conscious were located in different places, with a dynamic one, where he argues a particular “agency” is able to influence the structure.\(^7\) Using the metaphor of a telescope, Freud likens the operation of the psychical system to the way in which beams of light are refracted to form an image when they enter a new medium.\(^8\)

The operation of spatial metaphors to explain the arrangement of psychical structures and processes also appears in Freud’s “Introductory Lectures” of 1917. Here he uses architecture to position the role of censorship on the threshold between two rooms – conscious and unconscious – guarded by a watchman:

Let us therefore compare the system of the unconscious to a large entrance hall, in which the mental impulses jostle one another like separate individuals. Adjoining this entrance hall there is a second, narrower, room – a kind of drawing-room – in which consciousness, too, resides. But on the threshold between these two rooms a watchman performs his function: he examines the different mental impulses, acts as a censor, and will not admit them into the drawing-room if they displease him.\(^9\)

Freud develops his understanding of the roles played by both the topographic and dynamic models of the psyche in his 1915 paper “The Unconscious”.\(^10\) At the start of Part IV ‘Topography and Dynamics of Repression’, he employs the term repression or Verdrängung, which can also be translated as displacement, to describe ‘a process affecting ideas on the border between the systems Ucs. and Pcs. (Cs.’).\(^11\) In ‘The Ego and the Id’ (1923) Freud goes on to articulate activities on this boundary in terms of the ego – a “frontier-creature” who “tries to mediate between the world and the id”.\(^12\) “The Ego and the Id” contains a diagram, which repositions the territories of the conscious, preconscious and unconscious spatially with respect to the three new entities of ego, superego and id. Freud places the ego below the preconscious and above the id circumscribed in a blob-like shape. Outside the blob’s boundary, at the top of the diagram, next to the preconscious, the “pcpt.–cs.” is located, to its left a
box named “acoust.” and to the right a passage providing direct access to the id, under the ego, circumventing the preconscious.¹³

Ten years later, in 1933, in “The Dissection of the Psychical Personality”, Freud drew together these two triadic structures: “the three qualities of the characteristic of consciousness [sic]” – the conscious, preconscious and unconscious, and “the three provinces of the mental apparatus” – ego, superego and id; into one socio-spatial analogy using a geographical and cultural metaphor:

I am imagining a country with a landscape of varying configuration – hill-country, plains, and chains of lakes –, and with a mixed population: it is inhabited by Germans, Magyars and Slovaks, who carry on different activities.¹⁴

The paper also includes a final diagram, a reworked version of the one from “The Ego and the Id”, this time including the superego to the left of the ego in the position previously occupied by “acoust.” and the unconscious placed between the ego and the id. In this version the encircling boundary has an opening at the bottom, but the entry to the passage of repression is sealed.¹⁵ Taken together these various diagrams indicate Freud’s reliance on drawing as well as writing for representing his changing understanding of his models – in particular topographic – of the psyche, but they also demonstrate the limits of such systems of meaning for articulating the relation between intrapsychic and intersubjective space. As diagrams, the lines might be read as distinctions between two dimensional entities; when read as architectural drawings, the lines rendered in plan or section, might indicate boundaries which exist as surfaces and interfaces.

Psychoanalyst Didier Anzieu and feminist philosopher Elizabeth Grosz have shown great interest in the skin as surface and the role it plays as external boundary in Freud’s construction of the psyche. Anzieu’s concepts of the skin-ego and psychic envelope, draw together the skin’s role as a physical organ and its psychic function in
establishing a boundary between inside and outside realities. He comments on how Freud’s formulations of the ego from “The Project” of 1895 are energetic, whereas in “The Ego and the Id” of 1923 the energetic functions of the ego are “transformed in order to discover the functions of the psychic envelope”.16

This three layered psychic envelope delimits a triple frontier ... a frontier with the internal space of external objects, a frontier with the internal space of internal objects, and a frontier with the perceptual world. 17

Anzieu argues that for thirty years, the “dissymmetrical double-tree”,18 originating in his work on aphasia, remains an implicit model of Freud’s conceptualizations and practice. But “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” (1920) and “The Ego and the Id” (1923), Anzieu maintains, mark a break with this schema. The double-tree structure gives way to the image and notion of a vesicle, an outer envelope, representing the psychical apparatus. The accent shifts from conscious and unconscious psychical contents to the role of the psyche as container, but no ordinary container, one that is inscribed with signs:

The skin ego is at once a sac containing together the pieces of the self, an excitation-screen, a surface on which signs are inscribed, and guardian of the intensity of instincts that it localizes in a bodily source, in this or that sensitive zone of the skin.19

Following Anzieu, Grosz describes how the information provided by the surface of the skin is “both endogenous and exogenous, active and passive, receptive and expressive”.20 From her examination of two Freudian texts, “On Narcissism: An Introduction” (1914) and “The Ego and the Id” (1923), she explores how the ego is a “mapping of the body’s inner surface, the surface of sensations, intensities, and affects”, but that since it is derived from two kinds of “surface” it is also able to provide a “double sensation”: 
On the one hand, the ego is on the “inner” surface of the psychical agencies; on the other hand, it is a projection or representation of the body’s “outer” surface.21

But rather than a simple dividing surface, psychoanalyst André Green stresses that in Freud’s work from 1924 it is possible to “conceive of the whole psyche as an intermediate formation between soma and thinking”,22 allowing us to consider the material of the boundary not as a single surface existing between entities but as an extended passage which encompasses a number of different transitions.

We are now in possession of a complete system which starts with the psychical representations of the drive, closely linked to the body, opens out into thing- or object-presentations (unconscious and conscious), links up in consciousness with word-presentations, and finally joins the representatives of reality in the ego, implying relations with thought.23

It is possible then to read psychoanalytic diagrams as architectural drawings – plans and sections – and so to focus attention on the spatial structure – the boundaries, surfaces and passages of psychic life. Such a process brings psychoanalytic understandings of the complex spatiality of subjectivity into proximity with architectural practice so suggesting new ways of considering the interface between interiority and exteriority in architectural design, but also allowing the critic to contemplate the richness of the different subject positions – private as well as public – and distances – intimate as well as far – that one can adopt in the writing of architectural criticism, history and theory.24

Screen-Memory and Thing-Presentations: Scenes and Traces
Freud’s understanding of the relation between the exterior world and interior psyche operated specifically through his evolving concept of the workings of memory, of how external events registered or inscribed in the subject, are translated and/or repressed, and are later recalled or re-emerge. In his 1915 paper on “The
Unconscious” Freud put forward two hypotheses for how the unconscious and the conscious are related, one topographical and the other dynamic:

When a psychical act (let us confine ourselves here to one which is in the nature of an idea) is transposed from the system Ucs. into the system Cs. (or Pcs.), are we to suppose that this transposition involves a fresh record – as it were, a second registration – of the idea in question, which may thus be situated as well in a fresh psychical locality, and alongside of which the original unconscious registration continues to exist? Or are we rather to believe that the transposition consists in a change in the state of the idea, a change involving the same material and occurring in the same locality? ...

With the first, or topographical, hypothesis is bound up that of a topographical separation of the systems Ucs. and Cs. and also the possibility that an idea may exist simultaneously in two places in the mental apparatus – indeed, that if it is not inhibited by the censorship, it regularly advances from the one position to the other, possibly without losing its first location or registration. 25

Jean Laplanche, in his critical development of Freud’s work, has suggested that of the two hypotheses, the topographical or “reification” model correlates with the “impressions given by analytic work”, where through recognition unconscious elements are available to the preconscious and conscious systems, whereas the functional one is the “most convenient” for giving an account of repression, where conscious impressions become unconscious. 26

Alain Gibeault has argued that it is to “help overcome the difficulties inherent in the topographical and economic hypotheses”, that Freud turns, in “The Unconscious” (1915), to his concepts of word–presentations and thing-presentations, formulated in his work on aphasia from 1891. 27 Gibeault posits that Freud’s aim in this earlier research was “to relate such differences, not to varied forms of aphasia, but rather to distinct mental systems”. 28 The English translation of the aphasia work from 1953 includes the diagram “Psychological Schema of the Word Concept”, which shows two
complexes – “word-“ – an open network including “visual image for print”, “visual image for script”, “kinaesthetic image” and “sound image” – and “object-associations” – a closed network comprising “visual”, “tactile” and “auditory”.29 James Strachey notes that in “The Unconscious”, rather than the term “object-associations” used in his work on aphasia, Freud refers to “thing-presentations” (Ding/Sachvorstellungen). While the unconscious comprises only thing-presentations, consciousness is made up of both “thing-presentations” and “word-presentations” which together comprise an “object-presentation” (Objektvorstellungen), a third term missing from the aphasia work.30

The conscious presentation comprises the presentation of the thing plus the presentation of the word belonging to it, while the unconscious presentation is the presentation of the thing alone.31

Green maintains that “the canonical couple thing-presentation–word-presentation” is “at the heart of the Freudian problematic of representation”, stressing how visual associations are for the object what sound-images are for the word.32 Laplanche also emphasizes this distinction, describing how the word-presentation is of an acoustic nature, “made of words able to be uttered”, whereas the thing-presentation, a “more or less mnemic image” characteristic of the unconscious, consists of visual elements.33 Laplanche notes that up until “The Ego and the Id” of 1923, Freud connects verbal residues and acoustic perceptions on the one hand, optical residues and things on the other.34 For Freud, word-presentations are mnemonic residues of words that have been heard, while optical mnemonic residues are of things.35

As Laplanche and Jean Pontalis discuss, the notion of a mnemonic image or memory trace derives from Freud’s early work. They highlight how in The Studies on Hysteria (1893–1895) Freud explores the way in which mnemonic or memory traces are stored in an archival fashion according to several methods of classification, including chronology, position in chains of association and accessibility to consciousness.36

This means that a single event might be stored in various places: perceptual, mnemonic and connected with the presentation of ideas or Vorstellung.37
In “The Project” (1895) Freud differentiated between perceptual cells and mnemonic cells, perceptual images (Wahmehmungsbild) and mnemonic images (Erinnerungsbild). Following Joseph Breuer, Freud reasoned that it was not possible for the same system to operate in terms of perception, as the “mirror of a reflecting telescope”, and in terms of memory, as a “photographic plate”, and instead he suggested that separate systems of registration existed. He explained his thinking on this to Wilhelm Fliess in his letter of 6 December 1896:

As you know, I am working on the assumption that our psychic mechanism has come into being by a process of stratification: the material present in the form of memory traces being subjected from time to time to a rearrangement in accordance with fresh circumstances — to a retranscription. Thus what is essentially new about my theory is the thesis that memory is present not once but several times over, that it is laid down in various kinds of indications. I postulated a similar kind of rearrangement some time ago (Aphasia) for the paths leading from the periphery [of the body to the cortex]. I do not know how many of these registrations there are — at least three, probably more.

A diagram shows how one event may be registered in different “mnemic systems”, showing the three key terms Wz [Wahrmehmungszeichen (indication of perception)], the first registration of perceptions; Ub [Unbewusstsein (unconsciousness)], the second registration arranged according to causal relations and linked to conceptual memory; and Vb [Vorbewusstsein (preconsciousness)], the third transcription attached to word presentation and corresponding to the ego. This system of successive layers of registration was reworked in “The Interpretation of Dreams” (1900) and represented through a set of three diagrams.

Laplanche outlines how, in his Leonardo da Vinci study, also dating from 1900, Freud compares the way in which the individual stores up memory to two different kinds of history writing, the work of chroniclers who make continuous day-to-day records of
present experience, and the writers of history, where accounts of the past are re-interpreted in the present.\textsuperscript{44} Freud juxtaposes a person’s conscious memory of on-going events to the writing of a chronicle, and the memories a mature person has of their childhood to the writing of history, “compiled later and for tendentious reasons”.\textsuperscript{45}

Examining how memories could be falsified retrospectively to suit current situations, Freud went as far as to state in his 1899 paper “Screen Memories” that:

\begin{quote}
It may indeed be questioned whether we have any memories at all from our childhood: memories relating to our childhood may be all that we possess.\textsuperscript{46}
\end{quote}

While this paper considered the screening of a later event by an early memory, in “The Project” Freud had looked at a reverse type of screen memory, the screening of an early memory by a later event.\textsuperscript{47} With reference to the case history of Emma, Freud investigated how the laughter of the shop assistants in a later scene, “aroused (unconsciously) the memory” of the grin of the shopkeeper who had “seduced” her in an earlier one.\textsuperscript{48} This later “resurfacing” of the traces of childhood events, not registered consciously at the time, is developed subsequently by Freud into the two-phase model of trauma, \textit{Nachträglichkeit}, where as Green describes, “Trauma does not consist only or essentially in its original occurrence (the earliest scene), but in its retrospective recollection (the latest scene)”.\textsuperscript{49} Laplanche comments:

\begin{quote}
What is subject to the work of distortion and rearrangement in memory are not the childhood events (intrinsically inaccessible), but the first traces of them. ... The result of the secondary elaboration which is Freud’s interest here is the conscious memory: very precisely, the “screen memory”. But to evoke this term (\textit{Deckerinnerung}) is to indicate that it both covers over and presents the resurgence of something: precisely, the repressed.\textsuperscript{50}
\end{quote}
Freud distinguished between these two types of screen memory in “The Psychopathology of Everyday Life” (1901), defining “retro-active or retrogressive” displacement where the screen memory from childhood replaces events from later in life and “screen memories that have pushed ahead or been displaced forward” where the later memory covers an earlier one. He also adds a third possibility, “contemporary or contiguous” screen memories “where the screen memory is connected with the impression that it screens not only by its content but also by contiguity in time”.  

For Laplanche, Freud’s fascination with the term trace – traces in the memory (Gedachtnisspuren) or mnemonic traces (Erinnerungsspuren) – indicates his interests in the preservation of the unconscious, and how the trace left by memory, as the result of repression, is somehow of more importance to him than “memorization itself”. Laplanche suggests that Freud’s theory of memory involves both conscious memory, such as screen memory, which is closer to history, and unconscious memory, which is closer to archaeology. However, according to Laplanche, in archaeology each new construction involves a prior deconstruction, whereas in psychoanalysis the opposite is the case, all is preserved in the “hyperarchaeology” of the human subject. Laplanche argues that Freud’s aim was not to restore historical continuity by reintegrating lost memories, but rather to produce a history of the unconscious. In this history – one of discontinuity, burial and resurgence – the difference is that the turning points or moments of transformation are internal rather than external, described in terms of “scenes” as opposed to the “events” of history. Such an interpretation of the relation between psychoanalysis and history starts to suggest that the writing of architectural history could reflect more conceptually on its temporal structures – material and psychic – and take into account the different rhythms – from the repetitious to the event-based – through which the past resurfaces, sometimes expected but often unannounced.

The major scenes of childhood, according to Laplanche’s reading of Freud, are present consciously in memories and memories of dreams, “scattered, fragmented
and repeated”, their repressed aspects located inaccessibly in the unconscious. The scene is the principle form of reminiscence: a kind of memory cut off from its origins and access routes, isolated and fixed, and reduced to a trace. Breuer and Freud linked the symptomatic repetitions of hystersics, who were said to “suffer mainly from reminiscences”, to the memory of psychical traumas, described by Breuer as the “forcible entrance” of a “foreign body”. It seems that Laplanche picks up on this language, when he describes the unconscious as an:

“Internal foreign body’, ‘reminiscence’: the unconscious as an alien inside me, and even one put inside me by an alien.”

Critical of the way Freud opposes thing-presentations and word-presentations, and the unresolved opposition of his topographical and dynamic hypotheses, Laplanche proposes a process of translation-repression comprising two phases. The first involves “inscription” or the “implanting” of what he calls “enigmatic signifiers”, messages from the mother that contain aspects of her unconscious, and the second entails the reactivation of certain traumatic signifiers which the subject attempts to bind or symbolize. Failure to do this results in the repression of residue elements, that are not capable of signifying or communicating anything but themselves. Laplanche calls these untranslatable signifiers “thing-like presentations” (représentation–chose) in order to show that the unconscious element is not a representation or trace of an external thing. “Thing-like presentations” are not representations of things, but representations that are like things.

For Laplanche, “the passage to the unconscious is correlative with a loss of referentiality”. It is an effect of the process of repression, “a partial and failed translation”, that the “preconscious presentation-of-the-thing (Sachvorstellung, représentation de chose) is transformed into an unconscious presentation-as-a-mental-thing (représentation-chose) or thing-like presentation, a designified signifier”. Laplanche describes this unconscious residue as having a “reified and alien materiality”. As a message it signifies “to” rather than “of”, since despite the loss of its signified, this thing-like presentation can still communicate to an
addressee, verbally and non-verbally, through gesture. According to John Fletcher, Laplanche’s model of translation-repression rethinks the problem of unconscious representation by understanding repressed elements, not as memories or copies of past events, but as remainders or “waste” products of translations.

The concept of the thing-like presentation should not perhaps be translated too literally into architecture, but it does allow us to reflect on how – as emotional and cultural residues – built artefacts, drawings or models might materially embody and so suggest particular meanings for specific occupiers or critics depending on their own individual and cultural histories. We might also draw attention to how the psychic processes of repression and dislocation feature in the activities of design and criticism, where, for example, the initial value of a concept or a building, might, through repression, be positioned as residual waste, unrecognized in one location only to reappear as resonant in another. It is also possible that as “thing-like presentations” or “enigmatic messages”, architecture, with all its multifarious and sensuous details – visual, tactile and auditory, might communicate by signifying “to” us rather than “of” its lost signified.

Déjà Vu: The Cover-up and the Secret

Rather like the concept of screen memory, déjà vu is a substitute memory used in order to aid repression and to cover up something secret. The first time Freud uses the term déjà vu comes in 1907, in an addition to “The Psychopathology of Everyday Life” (1901), where déjà vu is defined as “unconscious phantasies”. Here Freud discusses the experience of a 37 year-old patient, who recalls how, on a visit made when she was 12 and a half to childhood friends in the country whose only brother was very ill, she felt she had been there before. Freud comes to understand that this visit reminded his analysand of the recent serious illness of her own only brother, but that this memory was associated with a repressed wish – that her brother would die, thus allowing her to be an only child. For Freud, it was in order to prevent the return of this unconscious and repressed wish, that her feeling of remembering was “transferred” onto her “surroundings”.

In “The Interpretation of Dreams” (1900) Freud had described how: “In some dreams of landscapes or other localities emphasis is laid in the dream itself on a convinced feeling of having been there once before.”70 He asserted that: “These places are invariably the genitals of the dreamer’s mother; there is indeed no other place about which one can assert with such conviction that one has been there once before.”71 In 1914, he returned to “The Interpretation of Dreams” to insert another sentence which identified the feeling of “having been there once before” in dreams as a specific kind of déjà vu: “Occurrences of “déjà vu” in dreams have a special meaning.”72

In the same year, 1914, in his paper “Fausse Reconnaissance (“Déjà Raconté”)” in Psycho-Analytic Treatment” Freud describes fausse reconnaissance and déjà vu as analogous and compares them both to déjà raconté, a feature of psychoanalytic treatment where the analysand believes erroneously that s/he has already told the analyst something. Acknowledging for the first time the contribution made by Joseph Grasset in his paper of 1904, Freud outlines the feeling of déjà vu as “an unconscious perception”, which later “makes its way into consciousness under the influence of a new and similar impression”. He also comments on the views of other “authorities” for whom déjà vu is a recollection of something that has been dreamed and then forgotten.73 Freud states that what such opinions have in common is the “activation of an unconscious impression” in déjà vu.74 Revisiting his earlier consideration of the déjà vu experience of his 37-year-old analysand Freud now emphasizes the activating role of her déjà vu experience, which, he argues, was “really calculated to revive the memory of an earlier experience”. He underscores how, because the analogy between her repressed wish that her sick brother should die and the dying brother in the house she was visiting could not be made conscious, the perception of this analogy was “replaced by the phenomenon of “having been through it all before”, so dislocating the identity of the common element onto the geographical location – the house itself.75

Much later in his life Freud turned his attention to the allied phenomena of
“derealization” and “depersonalization”. In his 1937 paper, “A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis”, Freud recounts a visit to the Acropolis made with his brother. He focuses on the odd sense of depression they shared in Triest when it was first suggested that they might make the visit, followed by an analysis of his own response once at the Acropolis – his surprise that it really did exist. Through a series of careful reflections, Freud slowly uncovers what he believes is at stake here: that what he felt as a child was not so much disbelief that the Acropolis existed as disbelief that he would ever get to visit it. This insight allows him to understand that the depression both he and his brother felt in Trieste was in fact guilt – a guilt that they would do the forbidden thing, surpass their father and visit the Acropolis (a destination for cultured travellers of the upper- and upper-middle classes) as he never had.

Freud goes on to interpret the phenomena of derealization as a kind of defense – a need to keep something away from the ego. He connects these derealizations, where “we are anxious to keep something out of us”, to what he calls their “positive counterparts” – fausse reconnaissance, déjà vu, déjà raconté – which he describes as “illusions in which we seek to accept something as belonging to our ego”. This description of déjà vu as a illusion, sits uncomfortably with his earlier work, where in 1907 Freud had specifically argued that it was erroneous to understand feelings of déjà vu as illusions: “It is in my view wrong to call the feeling of having experienced something before an illusion. It is rather that at such moments something is really touched on which we have already experienced once before, only we cannot consciously remember it because it has never been conscious.” This change of mind over the illusory nature of déjà vu – constructed in order to prevent the return of memories repressed in the unconscious – is something that Freud, frustratingly, never returns to resolve.

In a fascinating cultural history, Peter Krapp develops a connection between déjà vu and screen memory. Krapp considers déjà vu in terms of the “recurring structures of the cover up and the secret”, stressing how in his first published account of
parapraxis from 1898, Freud discusses the “psychical mechanism” as parallel to what he calls “unconscious hiding”. This spatial emphasis on the structure of concealing and revealing is a focus which Krapp continues to explore through his understanding of screen memory as “no mere counterfeit, but the temporal folding of two “memories”: it presents as the memory of an earlier time data that in fact are connected to a later time, yet are transported back by virtue of a symbolic link.” Yet the form of the fold is more complex than Krapp acknowledges, since it does not always occur in the same direction. As I’ve already discussed in the previous section, Freud put forward three different temporal models for screen memory, one where an earlier memory screens a later one, explored in his paper “Screen Memories”, another, which he referred to most often in subsequent work, where a later memory screens an earlier one, and a third where the screen memory and the memory screened come from the same period in a person’s life.

These architectural structures or folds – including the gaps, oversights, repeats and returns – are the strangest aspects of Freud’s own work on déjà vu. The most obvious is the fact that, despite describing déjà vu in his 1907 addition to “The Psychopathology of Everyday Life”, in relation to “the category of the miraculous and the ‘uncanny’” in terms of “the peculiar feeling we have, in certain moments and situations, of having had exactly the same experience once before or of having once before been in the same place”, Freud omits the term from his 1919 essay “The Uncanny”.

In “The Uncanny” Freud’s main argument is that the return of the repressed – the homely (heimisch) returning as the unhomely (unheimlich) – is located in the memory of the mother’s body:

It often happens that neurotic men declare that they feel there is something uncanny about the female genital organs. This unheimlich place, however, is the entrance to the former Heim [home] of all human beings, to the place where each one of us lived once upon a time and in the beginning. There is a joking
saying that “Love is home-sickness” and whenever a man dreams of a place or a country and says to himself, while he is still dreaming: “this place is familiar to me, I've been here before”, we may interpret the place as being his mother's genitals or her body. In this case too, then, the unheimlich is what was once heimisch, familiar; the prefix “un” [“un-”] is the token of repression.88

Through a careful examination of the etymology of the German term heimlich,89 and discussion of examples of the uncanny in literature, especially the relation between animate and inanimate, alive and dead, in E. T. A. Hoffmann's story The Sand-Man (1817), Freud shows how the uncanny is “the opposite of what is familiar” and is “frightening precisely because it is not known and familiar”.90 But he is careful to stress that not everything unknown and unfamiliar is uncanny, rather, and here Freud follows F. W. J. Schelling, the unheimlich is everything “that ought to have remained secret and hidden but has come to light”.91 It is striking that in his 1909 and 1914 additions to “The Interpretation of Dreams”, where Freud discusses the recall of the mother’s body in very similar terms, he connects this phenomena to déjà vu, and yet this term does not reappear in connection to his extended etymological account of the uncanny.92

As well as thinking of déjà vu as a spatial device, and of how Freud’s writing about déjà vu was a process unintentionally structured by its own aspects of repression and unexpected return, there are further possibilities for linking architectural space to déjà vu and the uncanny. A psychoanalyst who developed certain aspects of D. W. Winnicott’s work, particularly his concept of the transitional object and the mother as a facilitating environment,93 Christopher Bollas argues that in constantly altering the infant’s environment to meet his/her needs, the mother is experienced as a form of transformation, what he calls a “transformational object”.94 Bollas suggests that later, with the creation of the “transitional object”, the transformational process gets displaced from the mother-environment onto countless subjective-objects.95
Bollas links this first creative act to aesthetic experience, describing the “aesthetic moment” as one where an individual feels a “deep subjective rapport with an object”. 96 This feeling of fusion is, Bollas suggests, uncanny because it has the “sense of being reminded of something never cognitively apprehended, but existentially known”. 97 In a later articulation of this concept Bollas rephrases his argument using the term déjà vu to describe what he calls “a non-representational recollection conveyed through a sense of the uncanny”. 98

I have termed the early mother a “transformational object” and the adult’s search for transformation constitutes in some respects a memory of this early relationship. There are other memories of this period of our life, such as aesthetic experience when a person feels uncannily embraced by an object. 99

Literary critic Elizabeth Wright has noted that the uncanny has become an important term in “postmodern aesthetics” because it acts as a “challenge to representation”, one which makes us see the world not as “ready-made” but in the constant process of “construction, destruction and reconstruction”. 100 In architecture, Anthony Vidler has explored the uncanny as a kind of category that might to used to investigate certain kinds of building – for example, the haunted house, but also historical periods – the alienation of modernism, 101 but it is also the case that the practice of architecture might itself involve déjà vu experiences, and that, in triggering unwanted and often repressed responses in us, the uncanny registers architecture’s unconscious. 102

The Setting
The psychoanalytic space of the setting, that place which frames the encounter between analyst and analysand and the processes of transference and counter-transference that occur between them, provides the most architectural example of a psychoanalytic space and so a useful place to draw my essay to a close. In psychoanalytic theory, the terms frame or setting are used to describe the main conditions of treatment, which following Freud, include “arrangements” about time and money, as well as “certain ceremonial” governing the physical positions of
analysand (lying on a couch and speaking) and analyst (sitting behind the analyst on a chair and listening). 103 Freud’s rules for the spatial positions of the analytic setting, were derived from a personal motive – he did not wish to be stared at for long periods of time, but also from a professional concern – to avoid giving the patient “material for interpretation”. 104

I insist on this procedure, however, for its purpose and result are to prevent the transference from mingling with the patient’s associations imperceptibly, to isolate the transference and to allow it to come forward in due course sharply defined as a resistance. 105

In a discussion of Freud’s method, Winnicott distinguished the technique from the “setting in which this work is carried out”. 106 In Winnicott’s view, it is the setting which allows the reproduction of the “early and earliest mothering techniques” in psychoanalysis. 107 While Italian psychoanalyst Luciana Nissin Momigliano describes how Winnicott “defined the ‘setting’ as the sum of all the details of management that are more or less accepted by all psychoanalysts”, 108 Argentinian psychoanalyst José Bleger repositioned Winnicott’s term setting to include the totality of the “psychoanalytic situation” – the process – what is studied, analyzed and interpreted – and the non-process or frame – an institution, which he argues provides a set of constants or limits to the “behaviours” that occur within it. 109 Other analysts have used slightly different spatial terms to describe the setting, for Laplanche, it is a baquet, or double-walled tub, 110 and for Green, an écrin, or casing or casket which holds the “jewel: of the psychoanalytic process. 111

Green, who uses both Freudian and Winnicottian concepts in his work, considers the analytic setting a “homologue” for what he calls the third element in analysis, the “analytic object”, which ‘corresponds precisely to Winnicott’s definition of the “transitional object”, 112 and is formed through the analytic association between analyst and analysand. 113

The analytic object is neither internal (to the analysand or to the analyst), nor
external (to either the one or the other), but is situated between the two. So it corresponds precisely to Winnicott’s definition of the transitional object and to its location in the intermediate area of potential space, the space of ‘overlap’ demarcated by the analytic setting.\textsuperscript{114}

Green considers the setting a third space homologous to the analytic object created between analyst and analysand.\textsuperscript{115}

When I put forward the model of the double limit ... Two fields were thus defined: that of the intrapsychic on the inside, resulting from the relations between the parts comprising it, and that of the intersubjective, between inside and outside, whose development involves a relationship to the other. ... The object is thus situated in two places: it belongs both to the internal space on the two levels of the conscious and the unconscious, and it is also present in the external space as object, as other, as another subject.\textsuperscript{116}

The focus of the theory of object relations created and developed by the Independent British Analysts is the unconscious relationship that exists between a subject and his/her objects, both internal and external.\textsuperscript{117} In continuing to explore the internal world of the subject, their work can be thought of as a continuation of Freud’s research, but there are also important differences, particularly in the way that the instincts are conceptualised and the relative importance assigned to the mother and father in the development of the infant. Developing the concept of an object relation to describe how bodily drives satisfy their need, Freud theorised the instincts as pleasure-seeking, but Ronald Fairbairn, an influential member of the Independent Group, suggested instead that they were object-seeking, that the libido is not primarily aimed at pleasure but at making relationships with others. For Melanie Klein too, objects play a decisive role in the development of a subject and can be either part-objects, like the breast, or whole-objects, like the mother. But whereas for Freud, it is the relationship with the father that retrospectively
determines the relationship with the mother, for Klein, it is the experience of separation from the first object, the breast that determines all later experiences.  

Following on and also developing aspects of Klein’s work, Winnicott introduced the idea of a “transitional object”, related to, but distinct from, both the external object, the mother’s breast, and the internal object, the introjected breast. For Winnicott, the transitional object or the original “not-me” possession stands for the breast or first object, but the use of symbolism implies the child’s ability to make a distinction between fantasy and fact, between internal and external objects. This ability to keep inner and outer realities separate yet inter-related results in an intermediate area of experience, the “potential space”, which Winnicott claimed is retained and later in life contributes to the intensity of cultural experiences around art and religion.

Green compares the closed space of the consulting room to Winnicott’s notion of transitional space, noting that it has a “specificity of its own”, which differs from both outside and inner space. In a commentary on Green’s work, Michael Parson’s draws attention to his understanding of the analytic setting not as a static tableau, but as a space of engagement, not as “just a representation of psychic structure’, but as ‘an expression of it’

Parsons explains that for Green: “It is the way psychic structure expresses itself, and cannot express itself, through the structure of the setting, that makes the psychoanalytic situation psychoanalytic”. Green understands this as a spatial construction, as a “generalised triangular structure with variable third”.

The symbolism of the setting comprises a triangular paradigm, uniting the three polarities of the dream (narcissism), or maternal caring (from the mother, following Winnicott) and of the prohibition of incest (from the father, following Freud). What the psychoanalytic apparatus gives rise to, therefore, is the symbolisation of the unconscious structure of the Oedipus Complex.

Understanding how psychoanalysis might refer to architecture – as a structuring device, for example – is perhaps most obvious in the case of the psychoanalytic setting; its appearance in recent works of architectural theory as a site of
contemporary fascination,\textsuperscript{126} might well be because of its key role in the life of an iconic cultural figure such as Freud, but also because it is the most clearly architectural of the spaces of psychoanalysis. The setting exists as a physical and material architectural form – a room in a building visual”, “tactile” and “auditory”.\textsuperscript{127} – and as such it allows us to think about, not just the whole range of architectural spaces in which the professional practice of psychoanalysis takes place – from the private domestic interior to the hospital – but also how analogies might be drawn between the processes of analysis – transference and counter transference – that take place in the setting and those which operate in the design and occupation of architecture.

Bollas has noted that Freud’s clearest account of his method outlined in “Two Encyclopaedia Articles: A. Psycho-Analysis”,\textsuperscript{128} suggests that psychoanalysis takes place if two functions are linked – the analysand’s free associations and the psychoanalyst’s evenly suspended attentiveness.\textsuperscript{129} In “On Beginning the Treatment” Freud explains how, in including rather than excluding “intrusive ideas” and “side-issues”, the process of association differs from ordinary conversation.\textsuperscript{130} Bollas defines free association as that which occurs when we think by not concentrating on anything in particular, and where the ideas that emerge which seem to be the conscious mind to be disconnected, but are instead related by a hidden and unconscious logic.\textsuperscript{131} In order to achieve evenly suspended attentiveness Bollas explains that the analyst also has to surrender to his own unconscious mental activity; s/he should not reflect on material, consciously construct ideas or actively remember.\textsuperscript{132} Bollas connects the relation between free association and evenly suspended attentiveness to the interaction between transference and counter-transference,\textsuperscript{133} as does Green, who describes the role of transference as creating an “analytic association”.\textsuperscript{134}

According to Wright, “free association” brings to aesthetics, not the emergence of the truth of the unconscious, but rather the overruling of the censorship between conscious and pre-conscious. In her view, it is in the process of analysis that the revelation of unconscious defences, allows, not the “direct expression of the impulse
of the drive”, but “the idea or image which has attached itself to it”. It is only by “working through” this material, that the unconscious fantasy can be pieced together.\textsuperscript{135} It is possible here that “free association” and “working through” are processes that occur in design, but also ways of operating which could be brought into the writing of architectural criticism, history and theory.

In Freud’s later writings, in distinguishing between construction and interpretation as different forms of analytic technique, he makes reference to an architectural process:

> “Interpretation” applies to something that one does to some single element of the material, such as an association or a parapraxis. But it is a “construction” when one lays before the subject of the analysis a piece of his early history that he has forgotten ... \textsuperscript{136}

Green also proposes that analyst uses a constructive form of interpretation, that of “conjectural interpretation”.\textsuperscript{137} And psychoanalyst Ignes Sodré, in a conversation with writer A.S. Byatt, asserts that in “offering the patient different versions of himself” the analyst operates as a story-teller, suggesting an inventive aspect of interpretation.\textsuperscript{138} Following this line of thinking, I propose that it is possible to consider the act of architectural design and production in psychic as well as material terms, but also to take into account how psychic transactions feature in encounters between the various individuals in the design and occupation of architecture – from builder and client through to critic and user. But perhaps most pertinent to my own form of architectural practice – “site-writing” – is the possibility that critics might combine psychoanalytic modes – associative and attentive, interpretative and constructive – in their processes of writing.\textsuperscript{139}


7 Freud, ‘The Interpretation of Dreams (Second Part)’, p. 610.

8 Freud, ‘The Interpretation of Dreams (Second Part)’, p. 611.


35 Freud, ‘The Dissection of the Psychical Personality’, p. 78.


37 Anzieu (ed.) Psychic Envelopes, p. 48.


40 Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994) p. 35.

41 Grosz, Volatile Bodies, p. 37.


43 Green, Key Ideas, p. 128.

44 This was my ambition in my collection of essays and text-works, Jane Rendell, Site-Writing: The Architecture of Art Criticism, (London: IB Tauris, 2010).


48 Gibeault, ‘Travail de la pulsion et représentations’.


52 Green, Key Ideas for a Contemporary Psychoanalysis, p. 125.


A qualification is called for here in the case of “W” and “Er”. It will be found that these sometimes stand respectively for “Wahrnehmungsbild” (“perceptual image”) and “Erinnerungsbild” (“mnemonic image”) instead of for “Wahrnehmung” and “Erinnerung”. The only way of deciding for certain on the correct expanded version depends on the fact that the longer terms are of neuter gender whereas the shorter ones are feminine. There is usually an article or an adjective to make the decision possible; but this is one of those cases in which the reader must depend on the editor’s judgement ...’ See editor’s note Freud, ‘Project’, p. 288. The word *Wahrnehmung* is translated into English as perception and *Erinnerung* as memory.


James Strachey makes the point that the topic of memory distortion preoccupied Freud since he started on his self-analysis in the summer of 1897. Freud, ‘Screen Memories’, p. 302, editor’s note.


Green, *Key Ideas for a Contemporary Psychoanalysis*, p. 175.


Strachey notes that this point was interpolated in 1914. Freud, ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’, p. 399, note 1. But it is one thing to propose that the repressed unconscious wish whose return déjá vu aims to circumvent through displacement has its origin in a dream, but it is quite another to suggest as Freud does that it is possible to experience déjá vu while dreaming. Strachey comments that the interpretation of déjá vu Freud advanced in his additions to the Interpretation of Dreams (1900) made in 1909 and 1914, is very different to the one he first made in 1907 and re-acknowledged in 1917. See Freud, ‘The Psychopathology of Everyday Life’, p. 268, note 1.


Freud, ‘A Disturbance of Memory’, p. 245.

Freud, ‘A Disturbance of Memory’, p. 245.


87 Freud states that: ‘The German word “unheimlich” is obviously the opposite of “heimlich” [“homely”], “heimisch” [“native”] ...’ See Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, p. 220. He also notes that: ‘It may be true that the uncanny [unheimlich] is something which is secretly familiar [heimlich-heimisch]’. See Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, p. 245.


89 This investigation leads Freud from definitions of the word ‘heimlich’ as an adjective meaning, ‘belonging to the house, not strange, familiar, tame, intimate, friendly’, to situations where it is used in the opposite way, as both an adjective and an adverb, to refer to things or actions that are ‘concealed’, ‘kept from sight’, ‘withheld’, ‘deceitful’ and ‘secretive’. Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, pp. 222–225.


92 Strachey’s note placed after the word ‘body’ in the quote above refers the reader back to Freud’s earlier insertion into the ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’, where he ‘labels’ this experience *déjà vu*. See Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’ p. 245, note 1.


95 Bollas, ‘The Transformational Object’, p. 98.


Melanie Klein, the mother as a whole person, the child feels guilty for the previous aggression inflicted on the mother. See ‘Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms’ (1946) par.

A paranoid schizophrenic position characterises the child’s state of one-ness with the mother, where he or she relates to part-objects such as the mother’s breast, as either good or bad, satisfying or frustrating. See Melanie Klein, ‘Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms’ (1946) Envy and Gratitude and Other Worlds 1946–1963 (London: Virago, 1988) pp. 1–24. This position is replaced by a depressive stage where in recognising its own identity and that of the mother as a whole person, the child feels guilty for the previous aggression inflicted on the mother. See Melanie Klein, Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921–1945 (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1981).


132 Bollas, Free Association, p. 12.

133 Bollas, ‘Freudian Intersubjectivity’, p. 98.


135 Wright, Speaking Desires can be Dangerous, p. 19.


139 See Rendell, Site-Writing.