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Hotspots and Touchstones: From Critical to Ethical Spatial Practice

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ABSTRACT This essay starts with an event – what I have come to call “an ethical hotspot” – a moment in which my value systems were challenged and I found myself unable to continue to act as before, until I undertook some critical reflection. Marilys Guillemin and Lynn Gillam (2004) describe what they call “ethically important moments,”¹ which for them mark the “ethical dimension” of decision-making around the day to day dilemmas of research practice. For Guillemin and Gillam negotiating these dilemmas and their relation to institutional ethical procedures requires a degree of reflexivity on the part of the researcher. In this essay, I start by describing the ethical hot-spot that occurred in my life and then discuss how, by reflecting on these issues and the practices that I developed out of them, it might be possible to develop modes of ethical practice that I call – following Foucault – *basanic*.

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On 11 June 2011, a handshake occurred between Malcolm Grant, the then Provost of UCL and Andrew McKenzie, the then CEO of BHP Billiton. The handshake sealed the deal for UCL’s decision to accept \$10 million of charitable funding from the Anglo-Australian multinational mining and petroleum company, BHP Billiton, to create an International

Energy Policy Institute in Adelaide, and the Institute for Sustainable Resources in London at the Bartlett Faculty of the Built Environment. I was unaware that such funding had been secured, and was only told of the decision in a meeting in January 2013, almost two years later. Despite my role, I was Vice Dean of Research² for the Bartlett at the time, I had not been consulted. And when I finally was informed, as part of a Faculty Management Group meeting, I found that I did not agree with the decisions that had been taken.

At around the same time as part of a broader exercise in risk management being undertaken across the university, as a Vice Dean, I was asked to conduct a risk register to assess the risks of research expansion. In my view, the new relationship between UCL and BHP Billiton, although it expanded the research capacity of the Bartlett by funding a series of new PhD scholarships over a five-year period, posed a conflict of interest, and thus a reputational risk. How, I wondered, could independent research on sustainability be funded by profits – even when dispensed through a charitable arm – gained from mining fossil fuels? And even if UCL had done its so-called “homework,” and the right governance structures and due diligence procedures had been put in place, could these really protect the independence of academic research?

My concern was that, if we followed the basic principles set out in Brundtland Report of 1987, which states that sustainable development must be “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs,”³ then the mining of fossil fuels is unsustainable on two counts: first, fossil fuels are a finite resource, and second, as published climate science evidences, the limit of the ecosystem to absorb CO₂ has already been dangerously surpassed. I believed that UCL was taking a risk with its reputation for independent research into sustainability, allowing BHP Billiton to buy legitimacy for the continued mining of fossil fuels and to potentially influence not only policy on sustainability, but also the definition of this contested term.

In trying to understand more about the situation, I spoke to many senior managers at UCL, all of whom disagreed with my position, but for different reasons. Some argued that universities must engage with businesses in order to change them. But I was never able to grasp the stated logic, that, on the one hand, when the funding is at arm’s length, the giver of the gift – in this case the charitable arm of BHP Billiton – should not influence the research that is funded by the gift it has given, or benefit from the research done, but that, on the other hand, the receiver of the gift – in this case UCL – can and should influence the activities of the giver. I also encountered a range of other views, from: “it’s not where the money comes from, it’s what you do with it” to a more unexpected one that noted the potential ethical problems with sources of state funding.

However, on reflection, I judged the risk of potential damage to reputation to be significant enough to warrant purchasing a copy of a report by RepRisk on BHP Billiton.⁴

The RepRisk Index (RRI) is a quantitative risk measure that captures criticism and quantifies a company's or project's exposure to controversial environmental, social and governance issues. It does not measure a company's or project's overall reputation, but rather is an indicator of a company's or project's reputational risk.⁵

I argued that the issues raised in the RepRisk report concerning BHP Billiton's activities appeared to conflict with key UCL principles and procedures, as expressed in four documents: *UCL's Research Strategy*, *UCL's Environmental Strategy*, *UCL's Research Ethics Framework*, and *UCL's Guidelines for the Acceptance of Gifts and Donations*.

I have discussed these documents – as they were presented in 2013 – in detail elsewhere,⁶ so here, I will underscore how the findings of the RepRisk report suggested that BHP Billiton posed a reputational risk to any company it works with because of its degree of exposure to four issues – environmental footprint, community relations, employee relations, corporate governance; and its breaching of some of the ten principles of the United Nations Global Compact, particularly those concerning human rights and the environment.

In the end, I decided that I wasn't able to live with the contradictions, especially due to my own work on critical spatial practice, and that the only course of ethical action open to me was to “stand down” from my role as Vice Dean of Research in as public a manner as I could bear. The whole process had taken around six months, and in that time, I had become interested in ethics as a problematic, and the relationship between ethics, research and governance. I decided to make my acts of questioning the corporate funding of university research part of my work as an academic, to put into motion institutional work in education and research enabling that I am still developing,⁷ and to involve my own critical spatial practice of site-writing.

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In November 2015 I was invited to be “thinker in residence” for a month at the Tasmanian College of the Arts in Hobart. I combined my visit to Australia (and all the air miles this entailed) with research visits to a number of sites connected to BHP Billiton, this included Broken Hill, the “birth place” of BHP Billiton, a town in the Barrier Ranges of south Australia which started with the discovery of a mineral lode rich in silver, hence its other name – Silver City. While I was in Tasmania, I met artists Justy Phillips and Margaret Woodward, who were embarking on a new

initiative called *The Published Event*, which explores publishing as an art practice. They invited me to join *Lost Rocks*, a project which had started life due to a “find” in a secondhand junk shop – a board of Tasmanian rocks of which 40 of the 56 had been lost. Over the next five-year period, Justy and Mags were to approach 40 artists and writers to respond to a chosen lost rock, through what Justy calls a “fictionella” – a version of a novella, not made *up* like a fiction, but made *with*, lived experience.⁸

My own fictionella, *Silver*, starts with the story of Broken Hill, as presented in Silver City’s Albert Kersten Mining and Minerals Museum (Geocentre) explaining how the rock formation specific to the aboriginal land of Wilyu-wilyu-yong, and on which the finds of Broken Hill were pegged out, came into being, according to indigenous myth:

At each stop, the blood that dripped from the Marupi’s (Bronzewing Pigeon) wounds soaked into the ground, forming the unusual geological landforms we see today.⁹

As with many of my site-writings, which aim to re-perform in writing the spatial form of the subject they investigate, *Silver* is composed around the structure of the metallic element itself, whose number is 47, with its electrons arranged on 5 shells: 2, 8, 18, 18, 1. Silver corresponds with a five-part structure: Star-Crossed Beginnings (Twice); The Silver Age (in Eight Takes); A Two-Sided Tale (Eighteen times); (Eighteen Scenes) In Silver City; and *Une Crise de Foie* (Just the Once):

The first four fictionellas were launched in March 2017 at a curated event called *Sites of Love and Neglect*, at a number of sites, including the Zeehan West Coast Heritage Centre, as part of a larger arts festival called *10 Days on the Island*. Zeehan is an old mining town, in the west of Tasmania, founded on silver, by a mining magnate also involved in the establishment of Broken Hill and BHP.

For the launch event, I extracted texts from my fictionella and reconfigured them into a script called *Silver: A Courthouse Drama*, to be performed in the Courthouse, part of the West Coast Heritage Centre, where in the past legal proceedings related to Zeehan took place. The Courthouse museum has five clearly labeled positions – Witness, Clerk of Court, Police Prosecutor & Lawyer, Defendant, Magistrate, and benches where the Audience sits – and my script contained descriptions of settings, a list of characters, and instructions for action, and words to be spoken, at these specific positions.¹⁰

Silver: A Courthouse Drama deals with issues of justice and ethics connected to mining, including reference to the environmental disaster that occurred in Brazil in November 2015, a day when I was traveling from Tasmania to Silver City, and the tailings dam of a mine operated by Samarco, a joint venture between Vale and BHP Billiton, ruptured in Minas Gerais, Brazil, and ore residues and mining waste flooded the surrounding area, causing Brazil’s worst environmental disaster, burying

communities, leading to the death of 17 people, and displacing 725 others.

While I was thinker in residence, I also wrote an article called “Giving an Account of Myself, Architecturally,”¹¹ where I began to realize that the actions of “speaking out” that I had taken at home and work in various institutional settings, could be understood as forms of “critical spatial practice,” a term I came up with 2003 to describe practices that intervene into sites in order to critique them.¹² My own critical spatial practices took the form of “speech activities,”¹³ that responded to the specific cultural and political conditions and institutional codes at play in these sites and sought to intervene into them in order to critique them, but also, with others, to activate them politically. It was at this time, that I started to document traces of these speech actions and reconfigure them in text form, as pieces of prose, or “site-writings” that allowed me to reflect on my own position in relation to the events that had occurred.¹⁴

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To develop my understanding of what had happened to me, I turned to the work of Judith Butler and Michel Foucault, to Butler’s argument that ethical deliberation is bound up with the operation of critique and subjectivity, and her consideration of how the deliberating subject lives or appropriates sets of “norms,”¹⁵ and to Foucault’s understanding of ethics as intellectual and practical, as an active experience, related, according to Paul Rabinow, to how “who one is [...] emerges acutely out of the problems with which one struggles.”¹⁶ These philosophical writings helped me to figure out the relation ethics has to critique, to understand where “I” was in this shifting situation and to assess the options available to me and their relative ethical values – in short to do the work of reflection that Guillemin and Gillam advocate, and that I introduced at the start of this essay.

In *Giving an Account of Oneself* Butler argues that “the ‘I’ has no story of its own that is not also the story of a relation – or set of relations – to a set of norms.” She goes on to note that: “If the ‘I’ is not at one with moral norms,” this means that “the subject must deliberate upon these norms,” and that part of such a deliberation will “entail a critical understanding” of the social genesis and meaning of those norms. Butler writes:

In this sense ethical deliberation is bound up with the operation of critique. And critique finds that it cannot go forward without a consideration of how the deliberating subject comes into being and how a deliberating subject might actually live or appropriate a set of norms.¹⁷

In her close analysis of Foucault’s 1978 lecture “What is Critique” from *The Politics of Truth*,¹⁸ she notes how “critique is always a critique

of some instituted practice, discourse, episteme, institution, and it loses its character the moment in which it is abstracted from its operation and made to stand alone as a purely generalizable practice.”¹⁹ Butler talks of how, for Foucault, “‘critique’ is precisely a practice that not only suspends judgment for him, but offers a new practice of values based on that very suspension.”²⁰ Pointing to the way in which the practice of critique emerges from “the tear in the fabric of our epistemological web,”²¹ Butler outlines that, for Foucault, “this exposure of the limit of the epistemological field is linked with the practice of virtue, as if virtue is counter to regulation and order, as if virtue itself is to be found in the risking of established order.”²² Butler discusses how, according to Foucault, the signature mark of “the critical attitude” and its particular virtue is governance. She quotes him directly on this: “how not to be governed *like that*, by that, in the name of those principles, with such and such an objective in mind and by means of such procedures, not like that, not for that, not by them.”²³ Butler highlights how the virtue of the critical attitude which is highlighted by posing the question “how not to be governed?” is located in its objection to the imposition of power, which “inaugurates both a moral and political attitude,” and how the modes of response need to be understood as an art form. “I would therefore propose,” writes Foucault, “as a very first definition of critique, this general characterization: the art of not being governed quite so much.”²⁴

This connection of ethics to critique but also to governance held great resonance for me because of the way in which I had inadvertently entered into discussions concerning ethics as a result of my critique of UCL’s governance structures. And I became fascinated by Foucault’s account of *parrhesia* as a form of critical speech. In the autumn of 1983, Foucault gave six lectures at the University of California, Berkeley exploring the practice of *parrhesia* in the Greek culture of the fourth and fifth centuries BC. He examined the evolution of the term with respect to rhetoric, politics, and philosophy, and investigated the link between *parrhesia* and concepts of frankness, truth, danger, criticism, and duty. Foucault summarizes his thinking from the first few lectures as follows:

parrhesia is a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a specific relation to truth through frankness, a certain relationship to his own life through danger, a certain type of relation to himself or other people through criticism (self-criticism or criticism of other people), and a specific relation to moral law through freedom and duty. More precisely, *parrhesia* is a verbal activity in which a speaker expresses his personal relationship to truth, and risks his life because he recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve or help other people (as well as himself).²⁵

Foucault examines the function of *parrhesia* in terms of the crisis of democratic institutions, and also how *parrhesia* occurs as an activity in human relations, with respect to care of the self, and in relation to others,

specifically through three kinds of relation: individual personal, community and public life. Foucault talks of how, in the shift from a political to a Socratic or ethical form of *parrhesia*, the relation between *logos*, truth and courage alters to include *bios*, and to focus on the balance between *bios* and *logos* with respect to truth:

Here, giving an account of your life, your *bios*, is also not to give a narrative of the historical events that have taken place in your life, but rather to demonstrate whether you are able to show that there is a relation between the rational discourse, the *logos*, you are able to use, and the way that you live. Socrates is inquiring into the way that *logos* gives form to a person's style of life; for he is interested in discovering whether there is a harmonic relation between the two.²⁶

I came across this concept of *parrhesia* as I was composing one of my first public talks on the topic, and it helped me work between diary accounts and theoretical reflections, and focus on the need to find a harmonic relation between *bios* and *logos*. I realized that this process was a way of negotiating the kind of ethical dilemma or ethically important moment of which Guillemin and Gillam had written, and that it was through reflections of this sort – that were critical of both self and society – that one could develop a practice of *parrhesia*.

*

In July 2014, my research proposal, *Practising Ethics*, for a year-long project examining ethics in built environment research – pedagogically and professionally – received Bartlett funding. The project ended in June 2015, with an international conference, where speakers from academia and industry explored ethics in housing, international development, sustainability and governance. This developed into the Bartlett Ethics Commission and Bartlett Ethics Working Group, in which, with representatives from across the faculty and the university more widely, we engaged practically with UCL's review of ethics procedures.²⁷ As part of that work, Bartlett Ethics Fellow, David Roberts, produced a mapping of ethical issues in Bartlett research practice, the ethical codes that govern around sixty built environment professions, and developed ethical guidance for students, as well as a prototype for a set of guidance documents – “protocols” – that would help students and staff deliberate ethical dilemmas and make difficult judgements.

We have also hosted many events, including workshops and seminars, in which we have questioned whether the ethical principles drawn from medicine that universities have adopted for working with all human subjects, such as “informed consent,” “confidentiality,” and “benefit not harm,” are the most appropriate for humanities and, in

particular, participatory research. We are particularly concerned with how institutional procedures that govern ethical approval are most often guided by methods derived from medical research, and so are not necessarily aligned with concerns of humanities researchers, specifically practitioners. We have explored how we need to acknowledge how the positions we take up when conducting research are influenced by dynamics of power and knowledge, and inform conditions of trust. This includes the philosophies from which they are drawn, as well as the ways in which researcher/researched relations are defined. And in this we have exchanged ideas in conferences and workshops with researchers, Barb Bolt, Estelle Barrett and Pia Ednie Brown, from art, philosophy and architecture, and their idare project in Australia, where they have developed their own thinking and practice around the notion of “ethical know-how.”²⁸

Some of the conferences that I have hosted, such as *Rich Seams/ Dark Pools*, have focused on issues connected with sustainability directly, such as the need to divest from fossil fuel, and as a result have had to take place under Chatham House rules, as they have involved managers and administrators as well as staff and students, who wish to speak frankly outside their institutional roles. Others, such as *Speech ExtrActions*, co-organised with Diana Salazar, The Colombian Solidarity Campaign and London Mining Network, have involved more cross-cultural initiatives where, for example, those directly affected by activities related to mines co-owned by BHP Billiton, were, as part of a visit to the AGM of BHP Billiton, invited to UCL, to discuss their experiences.

It was this work with Diana from the Bartlett’s Development Planning Unit, and the Colombian Solidarity Campaign, that connected me with colleagues working on ethics and development planning. I was invited by Caren Levy to join a project called *KNOW: Co-production of Knowledge for Urban Equality*, and now lead a “work package” on “The Ethics of Research Practice” for an ESRC-funded project at the Bartlett’s Development Planning Unit.²⁹ Working with me, Yael Padan, has been examining the western-centric bias of many ethical values and terms that stem from enlightenment thinking that privilege the individual over the communal group or collective. We have been critiquing the usual triad of applied ethics – consequentialist, deontological, and virtue ethics – and instead been looking for different ways to navigate the relation between universal principles and specific cases, between on the one hand, the abstract and the general, and on the other, the lived and experienced.

*

From early in this project, we have discovered that ethics is understood as a practice, a way of negotiating relations between selves and others. Ethical practices may be governed through the use and critique of institutional codes and procedures, but they are simultaneously generated out of the mess of daily research life. It is not uncommon for

Guillemin and Gillam's "ethically-important moment" or my "hotspot" to be the starting point for raising ethical awareness, but it is in the critical reflection that takes place afterwards that new forms of ethical knowledge can emerge.

One way of considering how the interpersonal and epistemological aspects of ethical research practice, are connected is through practices of "subjectivation"³⁰ as advanced by Foucault. These "technologies of the self," as Foucault describes them, place the practices of care for the self, over practices of knowing oneself; these are the techniques through which subjects develop themselves, establishing their relation to moral codes and norms with respect to their own lives. And, as Butler stresses, in her critical engagement with Foucault's work in this area, through dyadic encounters with others. In *Giving an Account of Oneself*, Butler stresses how intrinsically linked processes of self-making and subjectivation are in the formation of the ethical subject. On the one hand, she writes, "There is [...] no forming of the ethical subject without 'modes of subjectivation' and an 'ascetics' or 'practices of the self' that support them,"³¹ and on the other, that: "There is no making of oneself (*poiesis*) outside of a mode of subjectivation (*assujettissement*)."³²

We find in Foucault's lectures on *parrhesia*, that when he describes Socrates asking Laches to "give the reason for his courage," he is not asking for an examination of conscience, a confession, or a narration of events in one's life, but rather to "make appear the logos which gives rational, intelligible form to this courage."³³ The role that Socrates takes, for Foucault, in asking for a rational accounting, is that of a "'basanos' or 'touchstone' which tests the degree of accord between a person's life and its principle of intelligibility or logos:"

The Greek word "basanos" refers to a "touchstone," i.e., a black stone which is used to test the genuineness of gold by examining the streak left on the stone when "touched" by the gold in question. Similarly, Socrates' "basanic" role enables him to determine the true nature of the relation between the logos and bios of those who come into contact with him.

Frédéric Gros has described how, "The desired *harmonic* correspondence is discovered precisely in this: the relation between acts and words."³⁴ For a practice to be ethical it is vital to do the work of connecting the *bios*, or the acts that comprise a person's life, with the *logos*, or words that express a principle of intelligibility. As the editors of this special issue reflected back to me in their comments on this essay – the logos might be understood in terms of a code that is activated by its performance, "that something is shared by being performed," and further that "this says something important about collective life." If a person's ethical life is performed in response to a code that is given by another, at

the same time relations between people create performances of these codes. From the invitation to write a fictionella offered to me by Justy and Mags, to the paper on “difficult moments” shared by Yael, and now the feedback on “hotspots and touchstones” offered by Lorens and Cameron; these suggestions by others constitute a collective response to my hotspot. While a hotspot might be a solitary moment in which an individual experiences ethical awareness, touchstones can emerge through the critical reflection and creative practice undertaken together in response. The touchstone heightens the importance of touch, of the human contact that takes place between us, highlighting the importance of the roles we play for each other in negotiating relations between what is said and what is done. Researching and writing together, with each other, it is not for one person to be virtuous or to be the moral judge of the other, but for us all to become basanic.

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Notes

1. Marilys Guillemain and Lynn Gillam, “Ethics, Reflexivity, and ‘Ethically Important Moments’ in Research,” *Qualitative Inquiry* 10, no. 2 (2004): 261–280.
2. There is no official or formal job description of a vice dean’s position or duties at UCL in general or in the Bartlett in particular, but in practice they are a deputy to the dean and their role is to assist and support their specific dean in core areas such as teaching, research, enterprise, and international activities, and/or areas for focus and development, such as most recently in the Bartlett, of policy and public health. This positions the role holder in a structure of institutional governance in which the often unspoken expectation is that they will enact decisions taken by those in higher management roles, but as we will see in this paper, there is also the possibility to make ethical judgments, question governance structures, and propose alternatives. One way in which such an ethical critique may be practiced is the subject of this essay.
3. See “Our Common Future: Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development,” *UN Documents: Gathering a Body of Global Agreements*. www.un-documents.net/ocf-02.htm#1 (accessed February 4, 2020).
4. See RepRisk, *RepRisk Company Report, BHP Billiton PLC (also listed as BHP Billiton Ltd)* (Tuesday 28 May 2013).
5. *Ibid.*, 2. The report has no author as it is composed of an automated data search of media articles in which the name of a company is associated with

- controversies: “Since 2007, RepRisk has produced the largest, high-quality annotated (human-labeled) dataset that allows us to train our machine learning algorithms to be more accurate and effective in identifying ESG risks.” <https://www.reprisk.com/approach> (accessed June 4, 2020). No ethical judgements are made by individual authors, rather the risks are assessed and mapped against sets of external criteria: “Born out of credit risk management, the purpose of RepRisk’s dataset is *not* to provide ESG ratings, but to systematically identify and assess material ESG risks. We have always taken an outside-in approach to ESG risks, by analyzing information from public sources and stakeholders and intentionally excluding company self-disclosures. It is now well-accepted that self-reported information is not reliable data – especially when it comes to risks.” <https://www.reprisk.com/approach> (accessed June 4, 2020). So unlike the ethical practice of *parrhesia* whose reporting on self and other is undertaken at some personal risk, and which I go on to discuss in this essay, for RepRisk the practice of self-reporting is seen to pose a risk in terms of reliability to the reporting of risk! In addition, the contract undertaken when purchasing the report require that it is not made public in its entirety.
6. Jane Rendell, “Configuring Critique,” in *The Routledge Companion to Criticality in Art, Architecture, and Design*, eds Chris Brisbin and Myra Thiessen (London: Routledge, 2018).
 7. See <https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/about-us/our-values/ethics-built-environment> (accessed February 4, 2020).
 8. See <http://www.apublishedevent.net/projects/lost-rocks> (accessed February 4, 2020).
 9. Jane Rendell, *Silver* (Hobart: A Published Event, 2016), frontispiece.
 10. *SILVER: A Courthouse Drama* was first staged from 4-6pm, Saturday 18 March 2017, as one element of an exhibition titled *CROCOITE. CROCOITE. SILVER. SILVER/LEAD* (17–28 March 2017), curated by Justy Phillips and Margaret Woodward, West Coast Heritage Centre, Zeehan Tasmania, as part of *Sites of Love and Neglect* (17 March 2017). See Jane Rendell, “Silver: A Courtroom Drama,” in *Building Critique*, eds Gabu Heindl, Michael Klein, and Christina Linortner (Leipzig: Spector Books, 2020).
 11. Jane Rendell, “Giving an Account of Oneself, Architecturally,” *Journal of Visual Culture* 15, no. 3 (2016): 334–348.
 12. See Jane Rendell, *Art and Architecture: A Place Between* (London: IB Tauris, 2006). Critical spatial practice aims to transpose the dual actions of critical theory taken from the Frankfurt School into practices that are both self-reflective and emancipatory; and to link these to spatial practices that offer critique in the form of Michel De Certeau’s “tactics” and Henri Lefebvre’s “representational spaces.” See also Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (1974, translated into English in 1991) (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1991) and Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, (1980, translated into English in 1984) (University of California Press, 1984).
 13. Michael Foucault is very particular about this term: “I use the phrase ‘speech activity’ rather than John Searle’s ‘speech act’ (or Austin’s ‘performative utterance’) in order to distinguish the *parrhesiastic* utterance and its commitments from the usual sorts of commitment which obtain between someone and what he or she says. For, as we shall see, the commitment involved in *parrhesia* is linked to a certain social situation, to a difference of status between the speaker and his audience, to the fact that the *parrhesiastes* says something which is dangerous to himself and thus involves a risk, and so on.” See Michel Foucault, *Discourse and Truth: The Problematization of Parrhesia*, ed. J. Pearson (1999). Six Lectures given by Michel Foucault at the University of California at Berkeley, October–November 1983, n. p. (<https://foucault.info/parrhesia/>) n. p. (accessed 4 February 2020).
 14. See Jane Rendell, “Critical Spatial Practice as *Parrhesia*,” special issue of *MaHKUscript, Journal of Fine Art Research* 1 (2), no. 16, (2016): 1–8.

15. Judith Butler, *Giving an Account of Oneself* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 8.
16. See Paul Rabinow, "Introduction: The History of Systems of Thought," in Michel Foucault, *Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth*, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley and others, *The Essential Works of Michel Foucault 1954–1984*, v. 1 (London: Allen Lane/The Penguin Press, 1997), xi–xliv, xix.
17. Butler, *Giving an Account of Oneself*, 8.
18. Judith Butler, "What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault's Virtue," in *The Political: Readings in Continental Philosophy*, ed. David Ingram (London: Basil Blackwell, 2002), 212–226.
19. *Ibid.*, 212.
20. *Ibid.*, 212.
21. *Ibid.*, 215.
22. *Ibid.*, 215.
23. *Ibid.*, 218.
24. Michel Foucault, "What is Critique?" [1997] trans. by Lysa Hochroth and Catherine Porter, *The Politics of Truth* (Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e), 2007), 45.
25. Foucault, *Discourse and Truth*.
26. *Ibid.*
27. <https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/about-us/our-values/ethics-built-environment> (accessed February 4, 2020).
28. Idare is a collaboration across universities in Australia, based at the Victoria College of the Arts, University of Melbourne, and funded by the Australian Government Office for Learning and Teaching which explores the role of ethics in creative practice, through both theoretical work but also participatory activities to build up a toolkit to help researchers and practitioners negotiate ethical dilemmas in their work. See <https://idare.vca.unimelb.edu.au> (accessed June 4, 2020).
29. <https://www.urban-know.com> (accessed June 4, 2020).
30. It is important to distinguish subjectivation from subjection in Foucault's work. "The history of the subject, from the perspective of the practices of the self and the procedures of subjectivation, is completely separate from the project, formulated in the 1970s, of the history of the production of subjectivities, of the procedures of subjection by the machines of power." See Frédéric Gros, "Le souci de soi chez Michel Foucault, A Review of *The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1981–1982*," *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 31, nos 5–6 (2005): 697–708, 698.
31. Butler, *Giving an Account of Oneself*, 21 (digital edition). See also Michel Foucault, *The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality*, Vol. 2 (New York: Random House, 1985); *Histoire de la sexualité 2: L'Usage des plaisirs* (Paris: Gallimard, 1984). She cites the page number as 28, referring to the English translation.
32. Butler, *Giving an Account of Oneself*, 21
33. Foucault, *Discourse and Truth*.
34. Gros, "Le souci de soi chez Michel Foucault," 704.

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